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Abstract
We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game : Principal, Agent, Corrupter.
When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conﬂicting interests to reciprocate.
This delegation eﬀect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what
arises in two-players settings. We set up two experiments varying in the exogeneity of the
delegation relationship. The experimental evidence supports the delegation eﬀect. This, in
turn, could account for the deterrence eﬀect of wage on corruption even in the absence of
detection.
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Summarizing a rather consensual conception, Jain (2001) deﬁnes corruption as the misuse of
a delegated power aimed at oﬀering rents to identiﬁable groups. Given that real economic
life widely resorts to delegation, the reasons why corruption attracts more and more attention
should be apparent. In fact, one could wonder why corruption is not more widespread given that
delegation generally involves diverging interests. Of course, economic theory has already partly
answered this question through contract theory and through Becker’s seminal work on crime and
punishment, in 1968. Although it explains why most of the economic agreements succeed in
reconciling diverging interests, the mixed results obtained by anti-corruption programs (Steves
and Rousso, 2003) strongly suggest that understanding the determinants of corruption behavior
largely remains an open question. In this paper, we derive some determinants of corruption
behavior from the conditions governing the delegation.
Among the recent literature on corruption, few studies have focused on corruption behavior
itself. Reciprocity, however, is recognized as a key feature of corruption contracts. Due to its
illegality, corruption cannot be enforced by third parties (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996).
Reciprocity between the briber and the person being oﬀered the bribe is thus expected to help
corruption contracts being prevented from an ex post renegotiation.
The enforcement power of reciprocity is quite well recognized in economics. Fehr, Gachter and
Kirchsteiger (1997) show that reciprocity substantially increases the set of enforceable contracts.
In a setting with which our corruption game shares common features, Clark and Sefton (2001)
conclude that cooperation can be reached as a result of reciprocity rather than altruism. Corrup-
tion, however, is diﬀerent enough from legal contracts to cast doubt on the direct transposition
of these results. To give an example, corruption is this special contract where punishment applies
only to the agents who were trustworthy : a person who receives a bribe does not incur legal
sanctions if the behavior expected by the briber is not subsequently adopted. Despite this speci-
ﬁcity, the enforcement of corruption through reciprocity is generally borne out by experimental
evidence (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 2002) even in one-shot games (Abbink, 2004).
Since the implementation of corruption relies partly on reciprocity, the organizational design
from which the agent inherits (and potentially misuses) discretionary power is crucial. Indeed,
2several studies have highlighted the gift exchange involved in delegation relationships, starting
with Akerlof’s (1982) well-known analysis. More recently, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)
observed that experimental ﬁrms systematically pay workers more than the competitive equilib-
rium wage. Experimental workers then reciprocate by an increased eﬀort. As a result, the wage
associated with delegation is a way to establish a reciprocal relationship with the agent.1
Consider a delegation relationship relying on gift exchange. There is room for corruption if
their exists a “briber” with who the principal experiences conﬂicting monetary interests. In this
setting, corruption appears as a decision driven by diverging incentives to reciprocate: corruption
implies a conﬂict in reciprocity because the agent cannot reciprocate to both the briber’s and the
principal’s fairness. This paper focuses on this delegation eﬀect as a determinant of corruption
behavior. In addition, the principal’s fairness manifests itself through the wage oﬀered to the
agent. The higher the wage, the stronger the conﬂict in reciprocity therefore experienced when
a bribe is oﬀered. The delegation eﬀect therefore provides microeconomic support for a negative
correlation between wage and corruption.2
Despite its empirical robustness, the eﬀect of wage on corruption has received quite few the-
oretical support. Yet, the main one is the indirect eﬀect of wage through the risk associated
with illegal activities. If a corrupted worker is ﬁred when detected, wages represent the op-
portunity cost of corruption (Becker and Stigler, 1974). There are, however, various countries
and/or contexts for which the eﬀectiveness of detection is doubtful, either because of deﬁcient
law enforcement3 or due to the fact that corruption is simply ignored 4.
In the absence of any risk of detection, only the direct eﬀects of wage on corruption behavior
remain into consideration. On the one hand, dishonest agents may exhibit lower reservation
1Akerlof and Yellen (1990) provide a review of the empirical relevance of this kind of incentive.
2Kaufmann (1997), Ades and Di Tella (1997), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) document this observation.
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) provide a synthetic discussion of the results.
3 Bac (1996), Mookherjee and Png (1995) and Carillo (2000) exhibits several mechanisms through which the
enforcement of law is compromised, as surveyed by Marjit and Shi (1998). One should recognize those mechanisms
in the failing of anti-corruption programs where corruption is too widespread, as shown in Steves and Rousso
(2003).
4As an example, no university teacher is supervised to prevent a student’s bribing for better scholastic results.
This possibility should however be taken into account in society’s designing of the delegation of education to
teachers since diplomas are consequently devalued.
3wage since they can expect to increase their on-the-job utility thanks to corruption. Low wages
thus attract dishonest agents, and raising wages attracts more and more honest ones (Besley
and McLaren, 1993). This explanation stems to a large extent from the assumption that agents
are either corruptible or not: if an agent is supposed to be non-corruptible, there is no level of
bribe that would make him enter into a corruption contract. We highlight here, a mechanism by
which corruptibility results only from the incentives oﬀered. In particular, each agent might be
corrupt or not, depending on the delegation relationships he faces.
On the other hand, the relative wage is sometimes supposed to determine the moral cost of
corruption through equity considerations. In this way of seeing things, corruption is more likely
to occur when the wage is perceived to be unfair in comparison with what employees in another
sector get. Relatively well-paid workers should then be less corruptible. Although convincing,
this equity hypothesis does not seem to be empirically relevant. Abbink (2002) studies corruption
behavior of experimental subjects as regards to this equity feelings. Beyond the subjects playing
a corruption game, the experiment also involves some workers asked to perform a given task
not related to corruption. All subjects are paid a ﬁxed wage, exogenously determined. In this
experiment, corruption behavior do not seem to react to the variations implemented in the wage
earned by the external workers. This results cast doubt on the role played by equity in corruption
behavior.
In this paper, we highlight the conﬂict in reciprocity an agent may experience when facing
corruption opportunities. To this matter, we develop a corruption game that relies on the inter-
action between three players.5 The room for corruption stems from the two features described
above. On the one hand, the agent inherits delegated power from a principal. Since the accuracy
of the decision cannot be evaluated perfectly by the principal, this power may be embezzled for
personal gain. Indeed, on the other hand, the briber do wants to lead the agent to such a misuse,
due to diverging interests with the principal. Our purpose focuses on the impact of delegation
5This feature has been well recognized since the earliest work on corruption such that of Banﬁeld (1975) or
Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978).
4on corruption behavior. In particular, this leads us to keep the link between corruption and
delegation design free from the indirect eﬀects of punishment.6
The typical case of corruption we want to adress is the well-known licensing example. Here,
a public oﬃcial is asked by the State to select a ﬁrm. The State wants the best productive
ﬁrm to be selected and the expected proﬁt of a particular ﬁrm depends on their being granted
the license. The principal (State) and the briber (any ﬁrm that do not deserve a license) hence
experience diverging interests. This open the doors for corruption. If the public oﬃcial has no
particular preference over the selected ﬁrm, he may accept the bribe and choose the ﬁrm oﬀering
it. Alternatively, he may be made suﬃciently conscientious by the administration hierarchy to
reject the proposal and pick out the most productive ﬁrm. Of course, he cannot choose both.
The public oﬃcial’s decision will thus lead him to betray either the State or the corrupt ﬁrm.
Those features form the basis of our experimental design. More precisely, we set up two
experiments, each of which are conducted under various conditions. In the ﬁrst experiment, a
player (agent) receives an exogenously ﬁxed wage for taking a costly decision. Before he makes
the decision, he can accept a monetary transfer proposed by a second player (briber), whose
payoﬀs are inﬂuenced by the decision. In the second experiment, a stage is added (before this
two-players corruption-game) whereby a third player (principal) decides on the wage owned by the
ﬁrst player. Inter experiment comparisons thus highlight the eﬀect of delegation on corruption.
For each experiment, we also perform various treatments, each diﬀering in the level of wage.
The marginal eﬀect of wage raises on corruption can then be deduced from intra-experiment
comparisons.
Earlier experiments have focused on the implementation of corruption in two-player settings.
Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) establish the enforcement power of reciprocity in corrup-
tion contract implementation. A treatment moreover studies the extent to which corruption be-
havior is sensitive to social considerations. Social stakes are incorporated by assuming that each
corruption contract imposes negative payoﬀs on all other participants in the experiment. Sur-
prisingly, they ﬁnd no evidence that this negative externality aﬀect corruption behavior. They
6Note however that detection is expected to reinforce the potential eﬀect of delegation : both the risk of
detection and the opportunity cost stemming from the wage lost should lower the level of corruption. As a result,
this assumption should not change our qualitative results.
5concluded that campaigns appealing to the conscientiousness of oﬃcials might be ineﬀective.
Idiosyncratic determinants of corruptibility such as gender, attitude toward risk or education
are examined by Frank and Schulze (2000). Men and students in economics appear to be more
corrupt. Those two player settings however fail to ﬁnd a negative correlation between wage and
corruption in the absence of detection (Schulze and Frank, 2003). This is a gap this paper aims
to ﬁll.
We ﬁrst present the three-player corruption game and its theoretical analysis. The experi-
mental design is developed in the second section. The third section presents the experimental
procedures. The results put in lights some determinants of corruption behavior, presented in the
fourth section. The last section concludes.
2 Three-players corruption game
We consider a three player game: Agent (A), Principal (P) and Briber (C). The Agent owns a
compensation from the Principal, w, for being in charge of a delegated task. Let e denote the
privately known eﬀort the Agent devotes to the task at cost v(e). Perfect veriﬁability of eﬀort
would lead to immediate detection of corruption on the part of the Principal. Private knowledge
of eﬀort is hence a necessary condition for corruption to occur. This is made by considering a
random production function. For every occurrence of the random state of nature, ǫ, the eﬀort
determines not only the Principal’s payoﬀs but also the Briber’s payoﬀs, fP(e,ǫ) and fC(e,ǫ)







Principal and Briber however expect diﬀerent increases in their payoﬀs according to the eﬀort
chosen.
For simplicity, we restrict our attention to three levels of eﬀort: e = ei, i = 0,1,2 depending
on which player is favored by the decision. In the ﬁrst instance, the Agent, by shirking, satisﬁes
neither the Principal nor the Briber (eﬀort e0, v(e0) = 0). In the second instance, the Agent
can favor one of them, by choosing either a productive eﬀort (eﬀort e1 such that fP(e1,ǫ) >
fC(e1,ǫ),∀ǫ) or a corrupt eﬀort (e2 such that fP(e2,ǫ) < fC(e2,ǫ),∀ǫ).
To induce the Agent to choose e2, the Briber may oﬀer a bribe. Let b denote the amount
the Briber proposes to the Agent. Obviously, the Agent can always choose honesty by rejecting
6this proposition. We denote by ba a bribe that has been accepted. We suppose that every non-
shirking eﬀort induces the same cost for the Agent: v(e1) = v(e2) = c > 0.7 Formally, this means
that when the Agent decides not to shirk, this positive eﬀort only implies diﬀerent consequences
for the two principals, i.e. once a positive eﬀort is exerted, choosing the corrupt or the productive
eﬀort determines how the surplus generated is shared between the Principal and the Briber: the
corrupt eﬀort only appears as a positive eﬀort shifting from the Principal’s interest toward that
of the Briber.
One can understand this assumption by thinking back once again to the public oﬃcial who
is responsible for ﬁrm licensing. He can either shirk or work. In the case where he works, he
either selects the best ﬁrm and exerts the productive eﬀort, or accepts a bribe from an ineﬃcient
ﬁrm and selects it, thereby exerting the corrupt eﬀort. Whatever the decision is, it aﬀects the
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ. For example, the ﬁrm cannot produce if the Agent does not grant it a license; faces
harder competition if another ﬁrm is selected; etc. Finally, when exerting either the productive
or the corrupt eﬀort, the Agent has to know the ﬁrm’s quality and evaluate its rank on the basis
of the ﬁles he has studied. He has to work this way in both instances : either in order to make
a decision based on a ﬁrm’s real merit; or in order to identify a ﬁrm whose performance would
not ordinarily deserve the granting of a license, thereby leaving the way open for corruption to
occur.
The information structure of the game also reﬂects this typical corruption context. We
consider a sequential game in which :
1. Principal chooses the wage owned by the Agent;
2. A state of nature is randomly selected;
3. After observing the state of nature, Briber oﬀers a bribe;
4. Fully informed of all the preceding, Agent takes the decision.
Note that, unlike the Principal, the Briber is fully aware of the decision of the Agent since
the state of nature belongs to his information set. Assuming two possible states of nature, Good
or Bad, the whole three-player corruption game can thus be represented as shown in Figure 1.
7This assumption could easily be relaxed. It ensures that the structure of the game does not impose a distortion
in favor of one of the two positive eﬀorts.
7Figure 1: The three-players corruption game
Denoting respectively by subscript A,P and C the payoﬀ function (U) of the Agent, the
Principal and the Briber, the three-player corruption game payments are :

   
   
UP = fP(ei,ǫ) − w
UC = fC(ei,ǫ) − ba





v(ei) = c ∀i = 1,2 ; c > 0
v(e0) = 0
In this sequential game, the Nash subgame perfect equilibrium is straightforward. Whereas
eﬀort is common knowledge for the Agent and the Briber, the corrupt eﬀort cannot be imple-
mented by Briber. In fact, due to its illegality, the Briber is unable to resort to legal proceedings
in order to implement an eﬀort e2 even if a bribe was given. Thus, for every ﬁnite repetition
of the game, the Agent always chooses to accept the bribe but to shirk. Applying backward
induction, the Briber then never proposes a positive bribe and the Principal chooses the lowest
wage acceptable by the Agent.
Proposition 1 The unique Nash subgame perfect equilibrium eliminates bribery and implements
shirking behavior.
This theoretical conclusion is classical in the experimental literature on corruption. In par-
ticular, Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) also obtain such a theoretical prediction within
a two-players framework – related to the present corruption game. However, their various ex-
periments (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 2002 ; Abbink, 2002) show that reciprocity is able
to implement corruption, even in one-shot contracts (Abbink, 2004). Those results serves as a
benchmark in our study. We next introduce the three-players game, the comparison with which
highlights the eﬀect of delegation on corruption.
83 Experiment
We design two experiments. The corruption experiment (CE) eliminates the principal’s decision
from the game presented above. This benchmark reproduces the previous studies of corruption.
To test the impact of delegation on corruption, the second experiment, called explicit delegation
experiment (EDE), involves the principal in the corruption relationship. The eﬀect of the con-
tractual relationships between the Agent and the principal on corruption behavior can thus be
isolated by comparing the level of corruption between the two experiments. Finally, we conduct
each experiment under various treatments. Each treatment diﬀers by the level of wage earned
by the Agent. This provide evidence on the eﬀect of wage variations on corruption behavior.
3.1 Experimental design
3.1.1 Corruption Experiment (CE)
Our ﬁrst experiment involves only two players : the Agent and the Briber. This experiment thus
reﬂects corruption contracting only. It implements the following three stage game.
In the ﬁrst stage, the agent is endowed with a ﬁxed wage (WH, speciﬁed below). This wage
is common knowledge between the Agent and the Briber. The Agent earns this endowment
irrespective of whatever other decisions he makes. The state of nature is then randomly chosen,
and immediately announced both to the Briber and to the Agent. Given the production function,
the Briber decides whether or not to transfer an amount b of experimental units to the agent.
In the second stage, the Agent has to make two decisions. First, he is asked to accept or reject
the proposed transfer. He then chooses an eﬀort level, that is to say one of the three possible
eﬀorts : e0,e1,e2, called respectively choice A, B or C in the experiment.
Lastly, the Briber and the Agent are informed about all the decisions made. Before starting
a new period, each subject is informed about the experimental units earned for the period.
3.1.2 Explicit Delegation Experiment (EDE)
In this second experiment, the relationship between the Agent and the Principal is introduced.
A preliminary stage is thus added to the Corruption Experiment. In this stage, the principal
decides on the wage owned by the agent.
9In order to make clear for participants that this choice can either be selﬁsh or fair, there
are two possible wages from which the principal has to choose. The low wage (WL) is close to
the participation wage, thereby making the agent indiﬀerent as to whether shirking or choosing
a positive eﬀort. The high wage (WH) consists of a proﬁt-sharing proposal. The principal’s
decision is thus given by: w = {WL,WH};WL < WH.
Before playing the three succeeding stages, corresponding to the Corruption Experiment, the
Agent and the Briber are both informed of the Principal’s decision. Throughout the experiment,
the Principal knows only his own earnings and decision. He is never informed about the agent’s
behavior.
3.1.3 Each experiment treatments
In order to test the impact of wage on corruption, each experiment was conducted with various
levels of wages. In a Low High Wage treatment (LHW), the agent’s endowment in CE and the
high wage in EDE are ﬁxed at WH = 30. In an Highest Wage treatment (HW), both are ﬁxed to
the higher value of WH = 40. In EDE, the principal chooses between the high wage and a lower
level, WL. We hence observe corruption under this low wage as often as it is chosen. For ensuring
comparability between experiments, CE is therefore conducted under a third treatment, where
wage is ﬁxed to the lowest level WL.
The various combinations between experiments and treatments allow us to examine corrup-
tion behavior with respect to wage variations within either a two-sided corruption contract or a
three-player contractual relationship.
3.2 Experimental procedure
The experimental implementation of the game relies on the production function described in
Table (1). The agent’s disutility of exerting a positive eﬀort is ﬁxed at c = 10. The lowest wage,
taken to be WL = 15, thus makes the agent almost indiﬀerent as to whether shirking or not. To
avoid negative payoﬀs for Briber, the bribe was limited respectively to 70 or 100 respectively,
depending on whether the “bad” or the “good” state of nature occurred. One can easily verify
that the surplus created by a positive eﬀort is constant, ﬁxed at 30 whatever the state of nature
10Table 1: Agent’s production for each state of nature
Eﬀort Principal Briber Eﬀort Principal Briber
e0 70 70 e0 40 40
e1 100 70 e1 70 40
e2 70 100 e2 40 70
1a : Good State 1b : Bad State
is. The surplus expected from a corrupt eﬀort is thus far from the upper bounds imposed on the
bribe. The results should not be modiﬁed, therefore, on the basis of this restriction.
On the Principal’s side, this surplus is higher than the increase experienced when switching
from the low to the high wage. If the principal expects that a fair wage will ensure the agent’s
cooperation, it is then in his interest to oﬀer WH under every treatment.
The two experiments were played successively by the same subjects. CE was ﬁrst played by
participants randomly assigned to Briber and Agent role. The role were kept the same during
the whole experimental session. The three levels of exogenous wage were played for ﬁve rounds
each, following the increasing sequence WL,LHW,HW. The players exogenously assigned to
the role of Principal were placed in a separate room. During CE experiment, they were asked
to wait for the beginning of the experiment and made free to surf on the internet. Before EDE
experiment started, new instructions were read to each room. At start, the doors separating the
room were opened to make clear that the proceedings are common knowledge. The treatments
were played ﬁve periods each, LHW ﬁrst and then HW. At the end of the session, participants
were asked to answer a questionnaire that provides us various individual characteristics such as
gender, studies ﬁeld, age, etc.
Four experimental sessions were conducted at GATE (Lyon, France), with software developed
using Regate (Zeileiger, 2000). Overall, 87 subjects participated to the sessions. Since each
three-players group played in partners over the whole twenty-ﬁve periods, this provides us 29
independent observations. Participants were ﬁrst to third-year students in a law, economics or
chemistry degree. They earned on average 10 Euros per one hour experiment, which is much
higher than the minimum wage in France (slightly less than 6 Euros). The experiment last
around one hour and half.
11In order to avoid the “real-life eﬀect”, instructions were written using neutral language.8 Bribe
is referred to as transfer, eﬀort as choice and wage as payoﬀ. Players were called respectively
“Participant X” (Agent), “Participant Y” (Briber) and “Participant Z” (Principal). The two
states of nature were arbitrarily presented as “left-hand table” (g) and “right-hand table” (d)
reﬂecting the position of the good and bad states of nature in Table 1. The likelihood of each one
was ﬁxed to p = 0.5. The instructions read to Bribers and Agents are reproduced in Appendix
B. In order to ensure that instructions were well understood, participants were asked to ﬁll in a
questionnaire about the experiment. All answers were publicly commented on before starting.
4 Some determinants of corruption behavior
Proposition 1 states that corruption is not an equilibrium of the game we introduce. Previous
experimental studies (Abbink, Irlenbush and Renner; 1999) have shown, however, that reciprocity
between the Briber and the Agent is able to implement corruption contracts. Our ﬁrst hypothesis
checks the validity of this result in our experiment.
Hypothesis 1 In the Corruption Experiment as in the Explicit Delegation Experiment, signiﬁ-
cant corruption levels occur thanks to reciprocity.
If reciprocity does support corruption contracts implementation, introducing the delegation
relationships may then give rise to a conﬂict in reciprocity. In case the principal and the Briber
both seek for Agent’s fairness, the Agent has to betray at least one of them. When the principal
uses the wage as an incentive device, this delegation eﬀect should then lower the likelihood of
corruption. We formulate our second hypothesis accordingly.
Hypothesis 2 A principal choosing a high wage give rise to a conﬂict in reciprocity. This
delegation eﬀect lowers corruption in the Explicit Delegation Experiment.
Last, remember that the principal relies on the Agent’s reciprocity only when choosing a high
wage. If a delegation eﬀect inﬂuences corruption behavior, the level of corruption should then
8In fact, the results obtained by Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) tend to substantiate the fact that the
way instructions are written does not alter corruption behavior.
12be lower the higher the wage. Since our game do not include any risk of detection, there is no
reason for this correlation to appear in the Corruption Experiment.
Hypothesis 3 A higher wage lowers the level of corruption in the Explicit Delegation Experi-
ment through the delegation eﬀect.
The experimental results are analyzed with respect to these three hypotheses.9
4.1 Corruption contracts implementation
The level of corruption is revealed by the number of accepted transfers which successfully manip-
ulated the decision made by the Agent. In each experiment, we hence consider that a corruption
contract has been implemented when the bribe oﬀered by the Briber is accepted and leads the
Agent to choose the corrupt eﬀort. Despite the optimistic theoretical predictions we provided
above, signiﬁcant corruption does appear in both experiments.
Observation 1 Reciprocity is able to implement corruption contracts even in the Explicit Del-
egation Experiment.
Support We ﬁrst provide support to the implementation of corruption contracts.
Table 2: Corruption and Acceptation rates, by treatment
Treatment Wage Acceptation Corruption
CE 15 73 % 23 %
CE 30 67 % 30 %
CE 40 68 % 33 %
EDE - LHW 15 59 % 27 %
EDE - LHW 30 44 % 18 %
EDE - HW 15 49 % 14 %
EDE - HW 40 51 % 13 %
Table 2 oﬀers an overview of acceptation and corruption behavior under each condition (experiment/treatment
combination). Agents frequently accept the transfer proposed, accepting the transfer from 44% to 73% of the
9The raw data are available from the author upon request.
13time. This acceptation do not systematically lead to corruption. In fact, Agents are corrupt at most 33% of
the time. Despite the gap between acceptation and corruption, signiﬁcant corruption occurs. We construct an
artiﬁcial treatment where corruption is never chosen. Comparing actual behavior to this hypothetical behavior
hence provide a test of the extent to which corruption is pregnant in the experiment. Indeed, the hypothesis that
behavior is the same as if Agents were always uncorrupt is rejected for all treatment (matched pairs signed-rank
test, 1%).
It seems that Bribers anticipated this success of positive transfers. As shown in the last column in Table 3,
the average transfer oﬀered ranges from 8.46 to 14.06 across conditions. This is a clear deviation from the null
transfer predicted by the equilibrium. In fact, the hypothesis that the average transfer is null is rejected for all
treatments with at least 95% conﬁdence (matched pairs signed-rank test).
In the experiments, corruption hence occurs as a result of two deviations from equilibrium.
First, the Agent does exert a positive eﬀort in the last period of the game. At the stage before,
the Briber moreover oﬀers a positive bribe despite the lack of guarantee for corruption imple-
mentation. We now turn to the means by which corruption is implemented between Agent and
Briber. Among the various behavioral assumptions proposed in the literature10, it seems that
reciprocity is the most relevant explanation, conﬁrming previous ﬁndings on corruption behavior.
Support On the Agent side, the decision to exert the corrupt eﬀort is positively linked to the transfer proposed.
Table 3: Average transfer on agent’s behavior, by treatment
Treatment Wage Honest Betray Corrupt Overall
CE 15 2.66 13.72 28.14 14.06
CE 30 0.26 15.06 25.26 13.33
CE 40 0.38 10.25 24.66 11.89
EDE - LHW 15.00 0.89 12.89 25.33 11.38
EDE - LHW 30.00 0.48 14.36 30.60 9.49
EDE - HW 15.00 0.02 8.13 29.47 6.85
EDE - HW 40.00 0.05 13.80 24.40 8.46
Table 3 summarizes average transfer proposed distinguished upon Agent behavior. In the table, a decision
is labeled honest if the Agent refuses the transfer. This decision is mainly associated with very low transfers
proposals, ranging from 0.02 to 2.66. A decision is considered as a betrayal when the Agent accepts the transfer
10Rabin (1998) provides an insightful survey on the subject.
14but do not exerts the corrupt eﬀort. The average transfer leading to this decision ranges between 8.13 and 15.06,
hence corresponding to intermediate levels of transfers. Indeed, the highest average transfers are those that lead
the Agent to be corrupt : accepting the transfer and exerting the corrupt eﬀort.
This picture is conﬁrmed by the correlation between corruption decisions and the level of transfer proposed,
presented in Table 4. All correlations of transfer with corruption and acceptation are positive: a higher bribe
increases both the probability of acceptation and the likelihood of corruption. For all treatment but one (Corrup-
tion Experiment with a 40 endowment), the correlation is lower for acceptation than for corruption. This reﬂects
the fact that those acceptations that are followed by betrayals are associated with lower transfer proposals. For
acceptation as for corruption, the hypothesis that corruption and transfer are independent (i.e. correlation is
null) is rejected with highly signiﬁcant p-values (Spearman correlation test).
Table 4: Spearman correlations with proposed transfer, by treatment
Treatment Wage Corruption Acceptation Past Corruption
CE 15 0.612∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
CE 30 0.749∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗
CE 40 0.696∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗
EDE - LHW 15 0.758∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
EDE - LHW 30 0.832∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
EDE - HW 15 0.708∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
EDE - HW 40 0.792∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance Levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
On the part of Briber, transfer proposals also appears to be responsive to the decisions made by the Agent.
The last column in Table 4 provide Spearman rank-order correlations between transfer proposals and corruption
decision at the preceding period. A positive correlation hence reﬂects that Briber’s reciprocates to past corruption
by oﬀering higher transfer in the next period. For all treatments, correlations are positive and the hypothesis
that transfer is independent of last corruption decision is rejected. Our data allows to characterize further
the behavior of Briber. In fact, whereas the proposals react to the conditions we implement, we ﬁnd almost no
diﬀerence between positive proposals: conditional on being positive, bribery behavior is the same11. It then seems
that Briber adjust proposals according to a binary strategy (proposing or not) rather than using a continuous
adjustment in the level of transfer. This observation is congruent with what Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner
(2002) ﬁnd in their two-players experiment.
The reciprocity supporting corruption contracts is two sided. The Agent reciprocates to the
level of bribe oﬀered by choosing more frequently the corrupt eﬀort after a relatively higher
11A notable exception arise in transfer behavior under EDE 40.
15proposal. But the Briber reciprocates two, by proposing a bribe more often when an Agent
proved to be compliant.
4.2 The delegation eﬀect
Observation 1 establishes the validness of our ﬁrst hypothesis, aimed at conﬁrming previous
results on corruption behavior. As stated in Hypothesis 2, corruption being supported by reci-
procity opens the door for a conﬂict in reciprocity. This lead to a delegation eﬀect, through
the relationships settled by the principal. Our experiments support the existence of such a
mechanism.
Observation 2 For a given level of wage, the Agent tends to be less likely to be corrupt when
the delegation is explicitly involved, due to a conﬂict in reciprocity.
Support We ﬁrst present a brief overview of our statistical strategy. The empirical evidence is based on compar-
isons between the various conditions we observe (i.e. experiment/wage combinations). Since the same individuals
are observed under each condition, the tests are based on matched pairs. Tables 5 and 6 provide the results of
Wilcoxon matched pairs sign-rank tests for comparisons between the various control and treatment conditions
indicated in the ﬁrst two columns. The associated p-values test the null hypothesis that corruption behavior is
the same under control and treatment conditions.
For each comparison, the sign of the test indicates whether corruption is higher (+) or lower (-) under control
condition than under treatment. The control and treatment are deﬁned in such a way that our hypotheses always
predict a decrease in - or, at least, no eﬀect on - corruption while switching from control to treatment conditions.
As a result, we always expect the sign of the test to be positive. We hence provide one-sided p-values when the
sign of the test is positive and two-sided otherwise.
Last, we stressed earlier that transfer proposals are adjusted by Briber through a binary scheme: positive
bribes are more or less frequent but, conditional on being positive, the amount proposed is rather insensitive to
conditions. From now on, we are interested in the Agent’s behavior induced by a context of diverging incentives
to reciprocate. We hence isolate this behavior from variations due to adjustment on the part of the Briber by
analyzing Agent’s decisions in front of a positive transfer. Further support to our results is proposed thanks
to regressions on the decisions variables, presented in Section A. Although they provide a useful guide for the
marginal eﬀect of each variable, those regressions should be taken with much precaution. In particular, the
estimations do not account for the endogeneity that arises from decision variables (transfer and wage).
The delegation eﬀect is uncovered by comparisons between experiments for a given level of wage. The results
are summarized in Table 5. A clear dividing line appears in the result. While corruption is - not signiﬁcatively
16Table 5: Inter-experiment comparisons
Diﬀerence
CE EDE Sign p-value †
15 15 - 0.112
30 LHW - 30 + 0.096∗
40 HW - 40 + 0.008∗∗∗
Levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
- higher under CE than under EDE when wage is the lowest, it decreases between CE and EDE when wage is
higher. For the both high wages, the signs are positive and the null hypothesis that behavior is the same under
CE as under EDE is rejected with at least 95% conﬁdence.
We expect a delegation eﬀect to arise as a result of a conﬂict in reciprocity experienced by the
Agent. A necessary condition for this eﬀect to be eﬀective is then that a reciprocity relationships
is established by the Principal. That’s what we observe in the experiment. Indeed, the data
provide evidence of a signiﬁcant decrease in corruption due to delegation when, and only when,
the Principal chooses the highest available wage. We conclude that the delegation eﬀect do
explains corruption behavior. This delegation eﬀect stems from the conﬂict in reciprocity the
Agent faces.12
Hypothesis 3 was formulated based on the eﬀectiveness of this conﬂict in reciprocity. The
device used by the Principal to establish a reciprocity relationships is the wage chosen. As a
result, the level of wage may impact corruption behavior when such a delegation eﬀect exists.
Conversely, since this latter eﬀect is absent in the isolated interaction between the Briber and
the Agent, wage variations should leave the level of corruption unchanged in this context.
Observation 3 Corruption tends to be increasing in line with wage. The link is reversed by the
delegation relationship between the Agent and the Principal.
12The increase in corruption between CE and EDE under low wage moreover suggest that not only positive
reciprocity but also negative reciprocity is at stake in corruption behavior. Note that low wage in EDE is chosen
by the principal instead of an higher wage (either LHW or HW, depending on the treatment considered). This
can then be interpreted by the Agent as an unfair behavior, providing incentive for an increase in corruption.
Since the null hypothesis of identical behavior under CE and EDE with low wage cannot be clearly rejected by
our data, this suggestion should however be taken with precaution.
17Support Table 6 provides an overview for intra-experiment comparisons.
Table 6: Intra-experiment comparisons
Wage CE EDE
Control Treatment Sign p-value † Sign p-value
15 30 - 0.090∗ + 0.056∗
15 40 - 0.016∗∗ + 0.034∗∗
30 40 - 0.491 + 0.083∗
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
It then highlights the sensitivity of corruption behavior to the wage earned for a given delegation scheme
(anonymous for CE, explicit for EDE). The ﬁrst column summarizes the result for variations in corruption
behavior inside CE. The wage was expected to have no eﬀect. In fact, all signs are negative and they are
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Figure 2: Evolution of corruption inside treatments.
13This result is conﬁrmed by probit regression in Table 7 : wage on its own tends to increase the probability of
being corrupt.
18Since the three treatments were played successively, it could be the case that corruption increases from
one treatment to another due to learning. However note that learning should then be at stake not only across
treatments but also from one period to another. Figure 2 provides preliminary support against this hypothesis.
We draw the average level of corruption for each treatment. The trend patterns are very similar for all conditions,
including a strong end-game eﬀect. We moreover perform a test for learning by comparing behavior from period
to period inside each condition. For all conditions, the hypothesis that corruption behavior is the same from one
period to another cannot be rejected (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).14
On the opposite, the tests for corruption sensitivity to wage under delegation all are positive. Corruption
hence tends to decrease when the principal oﬀers higher wages and all decreases are signiﬁcant at less than 10%.
Our corruption game rules out the environments that were recognized to implement a link be-
tween corruption behavior and the level of wage (detection, adverse selection, equity...). Thanks
to this focus, an original result arises. It seems that the level of wage in fact helps corruption, in
the sense that the cost of the corrupt eﬀort is more easily bear by the Agent as wage increases.
When this wage is freely chosen by a principal, the delegation eﬀect breaks the link. As wage
increases, the conﬂict in reciprocity the Agents faces is sharper and sharper. As a result, the
Agent tends in average to reciprocate less to the Briber proposals, and the level of corruption
decreases.
5 Conclusion
In a moral hazard setting with ﬁxed wage, we argued that corruption may induce a conﬂict in
reciprocity: the eﬀort chosen may lead the agent to reciprocate to the fairness of one of the two
principals. The three-player corruption game features such a mechanism: an agent receives a
ﬁxed wage, strategically chosen by the principal. When exerting a positive eﬀort, the agent can
either reciprocate to the bribe received from a briber by exerting the corrupt eﬀort, or choose
the productive eﬀort the principal expects. Two experiments were conducted with the same sub-
jects, each containing various treatments. The corruption contract was isolated in a Corruption
Experiment whereas the three-players game between the principal, the briber and the agent was
14Once again, those results are conﬁrmed by the probit regression provided in Appendix. Once we control for
end game, time has no eﬀect on corruption behavior.
19examined in an Explicit Delegation Experiment. In each experiment, the reciprocity relation-
ships between the agent and the briber has been shown to implement corruption. Corruption is
lower when an high wage is chosen by a principal. This provides support for the delegation eﬀect.
Furthermore, each experiment was run under various levels for the wage earned by the agent.
Those treatments provide evidence on the link between wage and corruption. We surprisingly
observe an increase in corruption in line with wage. We conjecture that the result stems from
the fact that the higher the wage is, the easier the cost of exerting a positive eﬀort is bear. The
delegation eﬀect reverses the link due to the fact that the conﬂict in reciprocity the agent faces
is more and more accurate as the wage increases.
These ﬁndings have several policy implications. First, the delegation eﬀect relies on a reci-
procity relationship established between the principal and the agent. The results could thus
explain why corruption is more widespread in public administrations than in private organiza-
tions. Indeed, bureaucratic systems rely on impersonal delegation and rather indirect delegation
relationships. Those conditions are close to our two-players game, were corruption is easier to
implement. Second, since reciprocity is a well recognized device for corruption implementation,
it has been recently proposed (Abbink, 2004) to break the trust between the briber and the
agent by increasing staﬀ rotation. In fact, this solution has been implemented in several orga-
nizations, such as banks, where corruption is seen as a potential problem. Corruption behavior
in the Explicit Delegation Experiment shows, however, that this incentive to honesty could be
countervailing. In fact, breaking the reciprocity relationship between the agent and the briber
also breaks the relationship between the agent and the principal. It is an open question to know
precisely to what extent the delegation relationship is maintained when the agent belongs to the
same organization as before, but it is likely that increases in staﬀ turnover lead to less trust in
delegation, hence to more corruption.
An interesting avenue for further research would consist of explaining the determinants of
the agent’s betrayal of the briber’s trust. Since corruption cannot be legally enforced, betrayal
incentives should become a powerful device for corruption deterrence.
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23A Appendix: Regression
Table 7: Random effect probit on corruption behavior
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Lagged Corruption 0.063 (0.240)
Lagged Acceptation -0.160 (0.267)
Lagged Transfert -0.010 (0.011)
Proposed transfert 0.100∗∗∗ (0.010)
Wage 0.037∗∗∗ (0.010)
Wage under delegation -0.056∗∗∗ (0.019)
Right Table 0.478∗∗ (0.197)
Delegation 1.163∗∗ (0.481)
Round (1-5) 0.034 (0.114)





  σ -2.669∗∗∗ (1.018)
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
B Supplementary material: Rules for the experiment15
You are involved in an experiment in which you can earn money. The amount you will earn depends
upon both your own decision and that of the other participants’. All the decisions you have to take and
all information you need will be available on the computer assigned to you.
This experiment is split into two phases. The rules for the ﬁrst phase are described below. At the
end of this ﬁrst phase, new rules will be distributed.
At the beginning of this experiment, groups of two participants (you and one another) are randomly
constituted. Each group member is given, at the beginning of the experiment, a diﬀerent role. This
role is either X, or Y. Each participant keeps the same role and belongs to the same group
for the whole experiment.
15Original text in French. For EDE, the two phases were distributed and read as a single game.
24RULES FOR THE FIRST PHASE
The ﬁrst phase is composed of three parts, each part consisting of ﬁve periods.
How each period will unfold
At the beginning of each period, X receives an endowment announced to all participants.
At the beginning of each period, the table according to which the period will take place is randomly
selected. The table on the left is chosen with a probability of 0.5, the one on the right, with probability
0.5. X and Z know which table was randomly chosen.
X’s decision Cost for X Y’s Payoﬀ X’s decision Cost for X Y’s Payoﬀ
A 0 70 A 0 40
B 10 70 B 10 40
C 10 100 C 10 70
Minimum transfer 0 Minimum transfer 0
Maximum transfer 100 Maximum transfer 70
Left table(g) Right table(d)
During the period, X chooses between three options : A, B or C, which impacts the respective
earnings of X and Y. For instance, if the left table is randomly chosen and X chooses the option B, X
bears a cost of 10 units deducted from his earnings for the period and Y earns 70.
Before this decision, Y can oﬀer X a transfer. X can accept or reject this transfer. In case it is
accepted, the transfer is deducted from the earnings of Y and added to the the earnings of X. The
transfer has to be chosen between 0 and 100 when the left table is randomly selected. The transfer has
to be chosen between 0 and 70 when the right.
At the end of the period, Y is informed of the option X has chosen.
To sum up, each period in the ﬁrst phase is ongoing according to the following steps :
• 1st Stage: X earns an endowment.
• 2nd Stage: A table is randomly selected according to a 0.5 probability. X and Y are informed of
the choice of table and the endowment received by X.
• 3rd Stage: Y oﬀers a transfer to X, between 0 and 100 if the left table was selected and between
0 and 70 if the left table was selected.
• 4th Stage: X accepts or rejects the transfer.
• 5th Stage: X either accepts or rejects this transfer.
• 6th Stage: Y earns the payoﬀ speciﬁed by X’s decision.
– Y’s net payoﬀ equals this payoﬀ minus the proposed transfer if accepted.
– X’s net payoﬀ equals the endowment, plus the transfer if accepted, minus the cost of the
decision.
At the end of the period, your payoﬀ and your net payoﬀ for the current period appears on the
screen.
25How each part will unfold
The ﬁrst phase includes three parts. The only change from one part to another is the
amount of the endowment owned by X. This endowment is announced to all participants at the
beginning of the ﬁrst period of each part.
At the end of the ﬁve periods, every participant begins a new part. Groups and roles remain the
same during the whole three parts.
How will you decide?
The screen of your computer is split into three areas :
The ﬁrst one informs you both about your role for the duration of the experiment and about rules
which are applicable to the ongoing part.
The second one allows you to make your decisions. To decide, click on one of the buttons present
on the screen.
The third one reminds you of the decisions taken in the previous periods.
Example - Assume that X earns an endowment of 30.
All the participants are informed about the endowments X earns. A period begins.
A table is randomly selected, for instance the table on the right. It is disclosed to X and Y.
The player Y oﬀers a transfer to X. As the period is ongoing according to the right hand table, the
maximum transfer is 70.
We suppose Y is proposing 15.
X is informed about the proposed amount of the transfer. We suppose, for instance, he accepts it
and then makes his decision:
IF A IS CHOSEN IF B IS CHOSEN IF C IS CHOSEN
X’s payoﬀ is: 30 + 15 = 45 X’s payoﬀ is: 30 + 15 − 10 = 35 X’s payoﬀ is: 30 + 15 − 10 = 35
Y’s payoﬀ is: 40 − 15 = 25 Y’s payoﬀ is: 40 − 15 = 25 Y’s payoﬀ is: 70 − 15 = 55
Payment of your earnings
At the end of the experiment, we will add up your payoﬀs. This amount will be converted into
¤based on an exchange rate of 100 points = 1 ¤. You will be paid this amount in cash at the end of
the experiment. A lump sum of 3 ¤will be added to this amount.
If you have any questions, raise your hand, and someone will come to you. You are requested not to
communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you do so, you will be excluded without
payment of your potential gains. We would greatly appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
Many thanks for your participation.
26RULES FOR THE SECOND PHASE
The second phase is composed of two parts, each part consisting of ﬁve periods. Groups and
roles remain as during the ﬁrst phase.
At the beginning of the second phase, a participant is added to your group. Ti is the participant Z.
The participant Z involved in your group remains the same for the whole second phase.
How each period is changed
At the beginning of the each period, Z chooses X’s payoﬀ. To do so, at the start of each period
he chooses, at each period, between two possible payoﬀs. The two payoﬀs between which Z can choose
are announced to all participants at the beginning of each period.
After this decision, all the group members are informed about Z’s decision. Form this point, The
period is the same as during the ﬁrst phase. The table according to which the period will take place
is randomly selected, with a 0.5 probability for each table. Only X and Y know which table was
randomly chosen.
X’s decision Cost for X Z’s Payoﬀ Y’s Payoﬀ X’s decision Cost for X Z’s Payoﬀ Y’s Payoﬀ
A 0 70 70 A 0 40 40
B 10 100 70 B 10 70 40
C 10 70 100 C 10 40 70
Minimum transfer 0 Minimum transfer 0
Maximum transfer 100 Maximum transfer 70
Left table(g) Right table(d)
X then chooses between A, B or C. This choice aﬀects X’s payoﬀs, Y’s payoﬀs but also Z’s payoﬀs.
For instance, if the left table is randomly chosen and X chooses the option B, X bears a cost of 10 units
deducted from his earnings for the period, Y earns 70 and Z earns 100. Y is the only participant
who knows X’s decision.
To sum up, each period in the second phase is ongoing according to the following steps :
• 1st Stage: Y chooses X’s endowment out of the two possible choices.
• 2nd Stage: A table is randomly selected according to a 0.5 probability. X and Y are informed of
both the choice of table and the endowment chosen by Z.
• 3rd Stage: Y oﬀers a transfer to X, between 0 and 100 if the left table was selected and between
0 and 70 if the left table was selected.
• 4th Stage: X accepts or rejects the transfer.
• 5th Stage: X either accepts or rejects this transfer.
• 6th Stage: Y and Z earn the payoﬀs speciﬁed by X’s decision.
– Y’s net payoﬀ equals this payoﬀ minus the proposed transfer if accepted.
– Z’s net payoﬀ equals this payoﬀ minus the payoﬀ Z chose for X.
– X’s net payoﬀ equals the endowment, plus the transfer if accepted, minus the cost of the
decision.
27At the end of the period, your payoﬀ and your net payoﬀ for the current period appears on the
screen.
How each part will unfold
The second phase includes two parts. The only change from one part to another are the
two possible payoﬀs between which Z chooses. Those rules are announced to all the participants
before the ﬁrst period of each part.
At the end of the ﬁve periods, every participant begins a new part. Groups and roles remain the
same during the two parts.
Example - Assume that Z can choose between 15 and 30.
All the participants are informed about the two possible earnings between which Z chooses. A
period begins.
A table is randomly selected, for instance the table on the right. It is disclosed to X and Y.
Assume Z chooses 30. X and Y are both informed of this decision.
The player Y oﬀers a transfer to X. As the period is ongoing according to the right hand table, the
maximum transfer is 70.
We suppose Y is proposing 15.
X is informed about the proposed amount of the transfer. We suppose, for instance, he accepts it
and then makes his decision:
IF A IS CHOSEN IF B IS CHOSEN IF C IS CHOSEN
X’s payoﬀ is: 30 + 15 = 45 X’s payoﬀ is: 30 + 15 − 10 = 35 X’s payoﬀ is: 30 + 15 − 10 = 35
Z’s payoﬀ is: 40 − 30 = 10 Z’s payoﬀ is: 70 − 30 = 40 Z’s payoﬀ is: 40 − 30 = 10
Y’s payoﬀ is: 40 − 15 = 25 Y’s payoﬀ is: 40 − 15 = 25 Y’s payoﬀ is: 70 − 15 = 55
28Figure 3: Agent screen display for CE
29